NOTES
In its larger social aspect, the question of whether Chapter XIII or ordinary
bankruptcy represents a more desirable type of relief is a significant one. If the
admittedly paternalistic provisions of the chapter, providing for strict court
supervision of the economic life of the debtor for a period of years under the
plan, are to be retained, the question of whether the discharged debtor will revert to his former habits is an important one. The hope of Chapter XIII lies
in the conviction that, if a man is helped to pay his debts, but at the same time
is made to suffer for his former improvidence by full payment, he will learn a
lesson in the management of his finances and will not allow himself to face the
same situation again. It is generally admitted that the relief given under ordinary bankruptcy has not achieved that purpose. The question whether Chapter
XIII will achieve the desired result cannot be answered until the chapter has
been in effect for a longer time, and then only if a larger number of cases are
handled.

APPEALABILITY OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS OF
INDEPENDENT FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
While much of current controversy over administrative adjudication is concerned with limitations on the scope of judicial review of administrative findings
of fact,' difficulties have also arisen with respect to the time at which judicial review should be available.2 The "final order" rule today operates to prevent court
review of administrative determinations until the final stage of an administrative proceeding has been completed. The irreparability at that time of injuries
which litigants may have sustained in the course of proceedings suggests that
so inflexible a rule may be undesirable3 It is here proposed to examine the cogency of this criticism and to indicate the feasibility of permitting interlocutory
appeals from certain determinations of independent federal administrative
agencies. It is believed that such a course can be adopted, moreover, without
serious impairment of administrative efficiency. The increased protection of
private rights which this will afford may serve to alleviate some of the bitterness with which at present the business community regards the administrative
process.
The constitutional requirement of "case or controversy" imposes a decisive
restriction on the type of administrative rulings which may properly be brought

I For example, McDermott, To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies
25 A.B.AJ. 453 ('939); Landis, Administrative Policies and
the Courts, 47 Yale L.J. 5i9 (1938); Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion,
47 Yale L.J. 577, s88 et seq. (Ig38).
2 For a general discussion of the "time" problem see Appealability of Administrative Orders,

Be Reviewable by the Courts?,

47 Yale L.J. 766 (1938).
3Examples of interlocutory orders which may injure litigants are to be found in Crick, The
Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 4r Yale L.J. 539, 545 et seq. (1932).
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into the federal courts for review.4 Until the recent case of AFL v. NLRB,s it
was generally thought that only those administrative determinations which
were issued in the form of a command could give rise to a justiciable controversy. It was said in that case, however, that the effect and not the form of an
administrative adjudication was the test of justiciability, and that any administrative determination which of itself adversely affected a complainant or which
gave rise to an immediate clash of interest between a complainant and an administrative agency could be made appealable. 6 Such administrative determinations are generally termed "orders.", Difficult problems of statutory interpretation have been engendered by the failure of legislatures in drafting statutory review provisions to enumerate and differentiate between those rulings
which are properly reviewable as orders and those which are not.8 For example,
failure specifically to exempt determinations reached in the course of nonadversary proceedings from review provisions governing determinations made
by the same agency in adversary proceedings has imposed upon the judiciary the
task of determining from the language of the statute, its purpose and legislative
history, whether such exemption was actually intended or not. 9 This problem
has been raised with respect to a denial of a request for confidential treatment of
information by the Securities and Exchange Commissiono and with respect to
employee appeals from certifications and directions of election by the National
Labor Relations Board.x
Thus preliminary to the question of finality is the question of whether or not
the particular determination is an order. After a decision that it is, judicially
imposed barriers to review must be overcome before an appeal therefrom is
4 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (igii). See Borchard, Justiciability, 4 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. i (1936); Caldwell, Appeals from Decisions of the Federal Radio Commission, i J. of
Air L. 274, 299 (1930).

5 3Q8

U.S. 401 (1940).

6Ibid. at 408. Compare the discussion by Justice Frankfurter in Rochester Tel. Co. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 125, 129, 144 (1939).

This note is concerned only with those commissions the orders of which are appealable
to the circuit courts of appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. For an
exhaustive list of these agencies see Blachly and Oatman, Federal Statutory Administrative
Orders, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 582, 609 n. 73 (1940).

Frequently review provisions of statutes setting up these agencies merely provide that "any
order" shall be appealable, thus leaving the problems of which determinations are "orders" to
the courts. See statutes cited in note 14infra.
8 Several types of administrative determinations do not satisfy the requirements of justiciability and these may properly be termed "non-orders." For a discussion of these see Blachly
tnd Oatman, Federal Statutory Administrative Orders, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 582, 583 et seq. (1940);
Appealability of Administrative Orders, 47 Yale L.J. 766 (1938).
9AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 408 (1940).

lo American Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. SEC, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D.C. 1937); cf. American
Sumatra Tobacco Co. v. SEC, r1o F. (2d) 117 (App. D.C. i94o).
11AFL v. NLRB, xo3 F. (2d) 933 (App. D.C. 1939), aff'd 308 U.S. 4o (194o); International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 1o5 F. (2d) 598 (C.C.A. 6th 1939), rev'd 308
U.S. 413 (i94o), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. r44 (x939).
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permissible. Courts have said that judicial review of an administrative order
will not be granted unless the applicant has exhausted all available administrative remedies.-2 Likewise, in matters where technical knowledge is required,
the court will not encroach upon administrative functions and will not hear
appeals until the primary jurisdiction of the administrative body has been exercised."3
If all these requirements have been met, only the rule denying appealability
to orders which do not finally dispose of a controversy prevents review. Where
statutes allow an appeal from "an order" or "any order"'4 of an administrative
agency, courts have applied the so-called final order rule to deny appealability to interlocutory orders.' s While the policy behind the rule as applied in
cases at common law was to protect appellate tribunals against excessive litigation, when applied to administrative determinations the judicial purpose has
been, in the main, the protection of the agencies themselves from the detrimental effects of too numerous appeals. In accord with this policy, legislatures have
statutory appeal provisions, thus maksometimes incorporated this rule within
6
ing only final orders appealable.
12Porter v. Investor's Syndicate, 286 U.S. 461 (193x); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
2I1 U.S. 210 (19o8). See Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 Yale LJ.98z
(I939).
13 McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 Calif. L.
Rev. 129, 143 (1940). See Primary Jurisdiction-Effect of Administrative Remedies on the
Jurisdiction of Courts, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (r938); Rochester Tel. Co. v. United States, 307

U.S.

125,

131 (939); Shields v. Utah I.C.R. Co-, 305 U.S. 177 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem

Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259
U.S. 285, 291 (1922). Itis suggested that uniformity of regulation can be obtained only through
administrative determination where questions of reasonableness are involved. Conflicting decisions of various courts as to the reasonableness of rates or practices would lead to confusion.
See, for example, Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U.S.
48r, 494 (i91o); Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
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U.S. 426, 44o (19o7). The

"primary jurisdiction" doctrine is regarded by the Court as firmly established in Rochester
Tel. Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, at 139 n.22 (i939).
X4 Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (27) (1926); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 904 (i934), x5 U.S.C.A. § 78 (.y) (Supp. 1939);

Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 834

(935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 825 (x) (Supp.

1939); Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 86o (i935), 16 U.S.C.A. § 825 (i) (b)(Supp. 1939); Nat'l

Bituminous Coal Act, 5o Stat. 85 (1937), i5U.S.C.A. § 836 (d) (1939).
'5 SEC v. Andrews, 88 F. (2d) 44Y (C.C.A. 2d 1937); Philadelphia C.P.R. Co. v. Public
Service Com'n, 271 Pa. 39, 47, 49, 114 At. 642, 645 (1921); Potomac Edison Co. v. West, z65
Md. 462, 169 Adt. 480, 481 (i933); Utah Cons. Mining Co. v. Industrial Com'n, 66 Utah 173,
240 Pac. 44o (1925). Contra: State v. New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co., 85 N.H. 218, 156
At. 816 (1931),where the court interpreted the words "any order" literally; cf. Rochester Tel.
Co. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 143 (i939); Moore and Adelson, Rule Making Jurisdiction
and Administrative Review, 26 Va. L.Rev. 697, 736 (i94o); McAllister, Statutory Roads to
Review of Federal Administrative Orders, 28 Calif. L.Rev. 129 (1940).
16National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (i935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o (f) (Supp. 1939);
Motor Carrier Act, 52 Stat. 1237 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 3 05(h) (Supp. z939); In re Deseret
Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393, 3 P. (2d) 267 (193).
Section 5(a) of the Logan-Walter Bill, S.915, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. (i940), pro-
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The final order rule has a universal operation and prevents appealability
of every order issued in the course of an administrative proceeding except the
last one. This function continues in complete disregard of the varying degrees
and types of injury which an interlocutory order may impose upon a complainant and without regard to the specific needs of the administrative body which
issues it. This arbitrary character of the final order rule has led courts to rationalize a refusal to hear appeals from interlocutory orders on the basis of the
"primary jurisdiction" and "exhaustion of administrative remedies" doctrines
wherever possible. Clearly these rules do not apply to all cases governed by the
final order rule, but their close association has suggested the conclusion that
if a petitioner has exhausted all available administrative remedies, and if the
primary jurisdiction rule has been satisfied, appeal from an interlocutory order
will be permitted. Thus a rationale advanced to support the result of the final
order rule in curtailing appeals can be transformed into a theory providing a
basis for evasion of the operation of the final order rule when convenient. In
Federal Power Coin'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co.7 a provision of the Federal
Power Act that "no proceeding to review any order of the Commission shall be
brought by any person unless such person shall have made application to the
Commission for a rehearing thereon"' 8 was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to authorize review of any order, interlocutory as
well as final, in respect to which a rehearing had been sought and refused.'9 It
seems clear, however, that such disregard of the final order rule was not authorized by this provision and the Supreme Court on appeal so held.2° A failure
to distinguish sharply between the exhaustion doctrine and the final order
rule thus led the lower court to an anomalous result. Properly applied, the exhaustion doctrine does not affect the operation of the final order rule except
insofar as the former is an additional bar to the appealability of otherwise appealable final orders upon which a rehearing may be had. Only when a rehearing
on an interlocutory order is available do both doctrines operate to prevent appeal.
That there should be a tendency to avoid the use of the final order rule as
a rationale of decision indicates that the rule itself may not be a satisfactory
method of dealing with appeals from interlocutory orders. This is further borne
out by the fact that the effect of the rule is frequently evaded by permitting
vides for review of "the final decision or order" of an administrative tribunal by any party aggrieved. This bill, therefore, would give legislative sanction to the final order rule in cases
where it is today a matter of judicial application. This leaves the problem of interlocutory appeal untouched. McAllister, Administrative Adjudication and Judicial Review, 34 Ill. L. Rev.
68o (194o).
17304
lB

U.S. 375 (1938).

49 Stat. 86o

(1935),

x6 U.S.C.A. § 825(I)(a) (Supp. 1935).

19Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 94 F.(2d) 943 (C.C.A. 3 d 1938).
20304 U.S. 375 (1938)-
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litigants to achieve review in equity before the final order has been issued.21 An
analysis of the effects of interlocutory orders will serve to demonstrate the operation of the final order rule and to indicate the factors which are to be considered
in a proposed alternative method of treatment.
ORDERS DIRECTING HEARINGS OR INVESTIGATIONS

The first order of an administrative agency which may aggrieve a party is an
order directing a hearing or an investigation. Several instances of the type of
issue raised by the various commissions' orders for hearing will suffice to indicate the character of the grievances created by such orders and the reasons advanced to support the operation of the final order rule under these circumstances. In one case,- the Federal Trade Commission's denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint, based on the commission's preliminary investigation, raised
the question whether a municipal chamber of commerce was subject to the commission's jurisdiction. In declining to review the question raised by this interlocutory order until the final cease and desist order based on the hearing was
entered, the court refused to "halt inquiry at the threshold," although intimating that the commission's inquiry might be in vain.23 In another case an appeal
from a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint where there was an allegation
that no cause of action had been stated therein was also denied.24 Frequent
challenges to National Labor Relations Board orders for hearings are based on
the contention that the particular employer is not engaged in interstate commerce and is hence not subject to the National Labor Relations Act. 25 Under
2z The final order rule has been amended by statute in some jurisdictions to allow appeals
from specifically enumerated interlocutory orders. Thus, review of action of the federal district courts not involving final orders is specifically provided for in cases dealing with interlocu-

tory injunctions, receiverships, and criminal appeals. 43 Stat. 937 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 344
(Supp. 1939); 44 Stat. 233 (1926), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 227, 345 (Supp. 1939). See Crick, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 552 n. 64, where the state statutes containing similar provisions are compiled.
22Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 28o Fed. 45 (C.C.A. 8th 1922).
23 1bid., at 47.

24 See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920), holding that unless a complaint sets forth sufficient facts to show on its face a violation of law, an order based thereon will be set aside, even
when the order was fully warranted by the evidence. In Hurst v. FTC, 268 Fed. 874 (r920),
the court refused to enjoin proceedings under a complaint which allegedly did not state a cause
of action, although there was also an allegation of unconstitutionality. For a criticism of the
Gratz case see Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 57 (1924). See also McFarland,
judicial Control of the Federal Trade Commission 74-77, 79-8, 92-93 (933).
2SNinety-five injunction suits were filed in the district courts to restrain the labor board
from conducting hearings pursuant to the Wagner Act. In seventy-three suits of the ninetyfive, the district courts denied injunctive relief. NLRB Ann. Rep. 31 (1938). Compare Heller
Bros. Co. v. Lind, 86 F.(2d) 862 (App. D.C. 1936), with Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. Schauffier, 91

F.(2d)

73o (C.C.A. 4 th 1937). The Supreme Court in Myers v.

Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 3o3 U.S. 41 (1938), held that injunctive relief was properly denied. For an elaborate discussion of the Myers case see Conflict of jurisdiction between Fed-
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the final order rule the employer may not appeal from the order directing a
hearing on the merits of the case because of error in the decision of the jurisdictional point, but must wait until a cease and desist order is entered. Likewise, an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission assigning a reparation
case for hearing is non-appealable until the final order is entered, although the
commission is alleged to have no jurisdiction over the parties,26 or the parties and
causes of action have allegedly been misjoined.27
From the point of view of the litigant, mere issuance of this type of order may
at times cause severe injury in the form of creating suspicion on the part of the
consuming public,28 undermining investor confidence29 or causing strained relations between employer and employee.30 More directly, attendance at a hearing or an investigation involves a loss of time or money and an extended absence
of supervisory employees, which may result in organizational stress within the
enterprise.3X When the hearing may possibly culminate in withdrawal of an
operating license or other impairment of the earning power of the business, a
eral District Courts and the NLRB, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 425 (1938). See also The Federal Courts
and the National Labor Relations Act, 26 Georgetown L.J. 740 (1938). In Bradley Lumber Co.
v. NLRB, 84 F.(2d) 97 (C.C.A. 5th 1936), a prayer for a declaratory judgment was also dismissed.
26 United States v. Illinois C. R. Co., 244 U.S. 82 (i9,7); United States v. Los Angeles &
S. L. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927). See Bergstrom, Reviewability of Negative Administrative
Orders under the Rochester Telephone Case, 18 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 74 (1939).
27 United States ex rel. Delaware & H. R. Co. v. ICC, 5z F.(2d) 429 (App. D.C.

193i);

cf.

United States ex rel. Western Union Tel. Co. v. ICC, 279 Fed. 316 (App. D.C. 1922). Also,
a finding that a railway is not a street, interurban, or suburban electric railway within the
meaning of the statutory provision exempting such classes from operation of the Railway
Labor Act is not appealable. Shannahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (1938). But compare
Shields v. Utah I. C. R. Co., 3o5 U.S. i77 (1938), with FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Federation,
F.(2d) 968 (App. D.C. 1928).

23

28 Publicity and the Security Market: A Case Study, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 676, 681-83
(194o). Orders of the Federal Trade Commission have similar effects.
29"Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission on final consideration will actually
decide to enter a stop order is interesting, but not very important; for only a rare investor
would purchase securities from an issuer threatened with an administrative bar. When the
Securities and Exchange Commission actually delists a security, the news is important; but the
market drops when the order for a hearing is announced." Chester T. Lane, speech before the
Association of American Law Schools (x938).
30 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Petroleum Exploration Co. v.

Public Service Com'n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938).
31 In the Myers case the old labor relations board had instituted similar action against the
plaintiff. Although the proceedings were eventually dismissed, the hearings consumed a total
of 2,500 hours of working time of officials and employees and cost the corporation more than
$i5,ooo, none of which could be recovered. See Conflict of Jurisdiction between Federal District Courts and NLRB, 23 Wash. U.L.Q. 425 (x938). In Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Public
Service Com'n, 304 U.S. 209 (i938), the cost of attendance at the hearing and preparation of
the company's case was alleged to be $25,000.
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lower credit standing may immediately result from an order for a hearing.32
Moreover, some statutes insure compliance by providing penalties, civil and
criminal, for failure to appear at a hearing so ordered.33 Although the challenge
to the agency's jurisdiction may be sustained on appeal from the final order, the
damage caused by attendance at the hearing is, by that time, largely irreparable. Furthermore, where jurisdictional challenges are sustained the commission's work is wasted. Indeed, it may be argued that the danger of hasty and
ill-considered jurisdictional determinations is not acute, since administrative
agencies may well be loathe to dissipate their meager appropriations in lengthy
proceedings in which their jurisdiction is not clear.34 Nevertheless, jurisdictional challenges are frequent, and since administrative hearings are often lengthy
and costly, both to the agency and to the party before it, determination of such
challenges before these costs have been incurred may be desirable.
Denial of appealability to orders directing hearings has sometimes been supported on the theory that the primary jurisdiction doctrine permits court review only after the commission has exercised its jurisdiction at the hearing.3S
But two stages of administrative proceedings must be distinguished before the
applicability of this doctrine can be ascertained. The commission's original
order for a hearing is based on an ex parte determination that it has jurisdiction
over both the parties and the subject matter. If the commission's jurisdiction
is challenged, a hearing will be held to determine the validity of this challenge.
Until such a hearing is held, an appeal may reasonably be denied on the ground
of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as well as under the primary jurisdiction and final order rules. But if the merits of the jurisdictional arguments
are decided adversely to a petitioner after a hearing, by denying a motion to dismiss the complaint against him,36 the commission has concluded its fact-finding
function on the jurisdictional question. Hence, allowing an appeal at this stage
from such a denial or from an order directing a hearing on the merits of the complaint would not conflict with the purposes of the primary jurisdiction rule.
Where proceedings are conducted before trial examiners, of course, allowing an
32

For example, the FCC's order for a hearing to determine whether to revoke a license, and

the SEC's order for a hearing to determine whether to suspend unlisted trading privileges may
both result in this type of injury.
33 E.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 10, 38 Stat. 723 (i914), i5 U.S.C.A. § 50 (1934);
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21 (c), 48 Stat. 900 (i934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(c) (Supp.
i 9 3 9 ); Public Utility Holding CompanyAct § 18(d), 49 Stat. 831 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79(r)(d)
(Supp. 1939).
34 Mansfield, Administrative Finality and Federal Expenditures, 47 Yale L.J. 6o3 (1938).
3S Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
36 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 3o U.S. , 25 (1937): "Respondent, appear-

ing specially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Board, filed its answer ....
Notice of hearing was given and respondent appeared by counsel. The Board first took up the
issue of jurisdiction and evidence was presented by both the Board and the respondent. Respondent then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; and on denial of that
motion, respondent .... withdrew from further participation in the hearing."
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interlocutory appeal to the courts on the jurisdictional point would necessitate
either an intermediate appeal to the board or a direct appeal to the courts from
a ruling of the trial examiner.37 Although the latter course would be in derogation of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, it has the advantage
of promoting an expeditious determination of the issue.
It is further suggested that review of the commission's determination at this
stage coincides to some extent with the distinction, in the scope of judicial review, between so-called "jurisdictional facts" and all other facts as required by
the Crowell v. Benson doctrine. 38 If judicial review of commission determinations at this stage is to be de novo, there would seem to be little point in requiring an elaborate administrative proceeding to determine facts when such a determination is to be completely disregarded by the reviewing court. 39 Apart
from the merits of the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine itself, it seems that an appeal from orders directing a hearing would serve to clarify the type of issues
which fall within its range. 40 Benefit might also accrue from separating in the
time for review of determinations reviewable de novo from those which are
final merely if supported by substantial evidence. When both types of issues
appear in a single record before the reviewing court, there are difficulties in accurately distinguishing the degrees of finality applicable to each.
On the other hand, an absolute right to appeal on jurisdictional grounds from
orders directing hearings entails serious disadvantages. If administrative hearings and investigations could be postponed until jurisdictional questions were
determined by appellate courts, administrative adjudication would tend to become ineffective, if not positively useless, since speed is often the raison d'etre
of administrative tribunals. Thus, the constantly changing character of employer-employee relations and of employee affiliations requires swift action if
the National Labor Relations Board is to function effectively in the alleviation
of industrial disputes. This indicates that appeals from hearings ordered by
that board should probably not be allowed.
ORDERS REQUIRING PRODUCTION OF EvmENcE AND SUBMISSION OF TESTIMONY

Frequently orders setting a case for hearing are accompanied by orders requiring production of evidence and submission of testimony. Some commissions
are given authority to issue subpoenas enforcible by mandamus in the federal
courts. 4 ' Whether such subpoenas are appealable at the instance of the ag37 The Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure has considered the problem of interlocutory appeals from trial examiners to the heads of agencies. They have not, however, studied the question of interlocutory appeals from the boards to the courts.
38285 U.S. 22 (132). See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative
Law Theory, 47 Yale L.J. 538, 564 (i938).
39 See Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Col. L. Rev. I (1922); Clark and Stone, Review of
Findings of Fact, 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 19o (i937).
40 Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction, 45 L.Q. Rev. 459 (1929).
4'National

Labor Relations Act § 11(2), 49 Stat. 455 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. 161(2) (Supp.
Federal Trade Commission Act § 10, 38 Stat. 723 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 50 (1934); Federal Power Act § 307(c), 49 Stat. 862 (1935), 16 U.S.C.A. § 825m (Supp. 1939).
1939);
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grieved party, before the commission attempts to secure enforcement in the
courts, is the issue raised in the recent case of FederalPower Com'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co.42 It was there held that an order requiring the production of
copies of contracts and statements of working agreements between the plaintiffs and persons controlling them, as well as statements of payments made and
obligations incurred to such persons, was non-appealable under the final order
rule.43 Since in this case statutory penalties were assessable only for contumacious disobedience of the commission's order, denial of an opportunity to contest the order until the commission sought enforcement in the courts was not an
undue burden on one who disobeyed under a reasonable claim.44 It appears,
however, that the final order rule operates as well to deny appealability where
penalties accrue upon a reasonable but erroneous conception of the commission's
investigatory powers. Thus, where civil penalties were accruing against one
who had disobeyed an order of the Federal Trade Commission to submit detailed reports on the operation of his business, the Supreme Court held the order
non-appealable.s
It is submitted that orders requiring the production of evidence and testimony should not be reviewable until enforcement is sought by the agency issuing them because until enforcement is sought no real injury is suffered. But
where penalties accrue upon any failure to comply, review at the instance of
6
the respondent seems justified.4
M1ISCELLANEOUS INTERLOCUTORY DETERMINATIONS

Additional interlocutory determinations are issued throughout the course of
administrative proceedings. These vary with the nature of the proceedings and
42304

U.S. 375 (1938).

4'The lower court permitted the appeal. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Federal Power Com'n,
94 F.(:2d) 943 (C.C.A. 3d 1938). Biggs, J., dissented in part, saying (at page 95o), "The hearings before the Commission would be subjected to interminable interruptions by petitions for
review to the Circuit Courts of Appeal to determine the legality of every order made by the
Commission. Such a result inevitably would emasculate the Federal Power Actand render the
Commission unable to pass upon the very matters for which it was created, matters greatly
affecting the public interest. In my opinion such a result would be intolerable." Cases cited
note 15 supra.

44 Section 307(c) of the Federal Power Act provides that "Any person who willfully shali
fail or refuse to attend and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or to produce books, papers,
.. or other records .... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
subject to a fine or not more than $r,ooo or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one
year, or both." The Supreme Court has held that "willful" "fully protects one whose refusal
is made in good faith and upon grounds which entitle him to the judgment of the court before

obedience is compelled." Federal Power Com'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375, 387
(1938).
4s FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. 16o (1927). See also FTC v. Maynard Coal Co.,
22F.(2d) 873 (App. D.C. 1927).

46Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (igo8); Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission I, 28 Col. L. Rev. 708 (1928); Inquisitorial Powers of
Federal Administrative Agencies, 48 Yale LJ. 1427 (T939).
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with the purpose that the particular order is to serve. The established position
of the final order rul would seem to have prevented judicial consideration of
the injuries to which interlocutory orders subject litigants, except insofar as
such consideration has been accorded in courts of equity. With this exception,
however, appeals reach the courts only where there is a question as to whether
the order complained of is interlocutory or final.47 These cases afford an opportunity to study the type of injury which interlocutory orders may impose upon
litigants.
In Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co.4S the plaintiff radio station petitioned for intervention in a proceeding to determine whether the petition of a rival station for
an extended schedule of broadcasting hours should be granted. The plaintiff
claimed that, since financial ability to provide adequate service is required of a
licensee by the commission, and since an increase in a competitor's broadcasting
hours would result in a decrease in the plaintiff's advertising revenues, the plaintiff had a "substantial interest"49-in the proceedings and should be allowed to
intervene. The commission decided that the prospect of such injury was not
sufficient to give the plaintiff a "substantial interest" and denied the petition.so
Since the final order rule patently barred an appeal from this clearly interlocutory ruling, review was sought by a bill in equity. It was held that review
in equity was foreclosed by the provisions of the statute, which provided for exclusive review of commission orders in the circuit courts of appeals.5s The court
also said that the plaintiff's statutory remedies were adequate, since, as an "aggrieved" party, he could appeal from the final order granting the station license.S2 But this remedy appears inadequate since, if the plaintiff were not permitted to intervene and contest the evidence at the hearing, it would be a
stranger to the record on the appeal. The record would be filled with evidence
presented by the applicant favoring issuance of a license, and unqualified by
any evidence having a contrary tendency which might have been produced by
the plaintiff. Since the commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive on appeal, the chances of a reversal would be correspondingly reduced. It is recognized, however, that allowing appeals from a denial of a petition for intervention would greatly encumber the commission in
this type of case. Parties with frivolous or unsubstantial objections could cause
47 Bradley Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F.(2d) 97, oo (C.C.A. 5th 1936); Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Public Service Com'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938).
48 78 F.(2d) 729 (App. D.C. x935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 624 (1935); Administrative Control

of Radio, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1343 (1936).
49Section 59 of the commission's rules provides in part: "If the petition [for intervention]
discloses a substantial interest in the subject matter of the hearing the Commission will grant
the same......"

soCf. cases cited in note 53 infra.
5150 Stat. 197 (1937), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b) (Supp. 1939); McAllster, op. cit. supra note iS,
at 151.
S2See In re Deseret Mortuary Co., 78 Utah 393, 3 P.(2d) 267 (1931).
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considerable delay and embarrassment, and the interest of each station in preserving itself from competition indicates that such appeals would be frequent, if
only for the purpose of breeding delays. Yet, recent cases have held that economic injury such as was threatened in the Sykes case is sufficient to make a
petitioner a "party aggrieved" within the appeal provisions of the act.3 Adequate protection against such injury seems to require that appeal be allowed
from an order which denies a party the right to intervene in a proceeding wherein the entry of an order will aggrieve him.
It has been determined that there is an absolute right to withdraw a registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission until such
statements have become effective by the running of the twenty-day period.4 A
registrant's desire to withdraw before this date may be prompted by a sudden
change in market conditions which makes marketing of the securities inexpedient. 55 A refusal to permit withdrawal, though no stock has been sold, may affect adversely a registrant's credit standing, and perhaps also affect its market
for other issues. But since an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission
denying permission to withdraw has been held interlocutory and hence nonappealable,s 6a registrant in this position seems to have no adequate remedy to
enforce his right.57 Only if the commission should seek to enforce a subpoena
against him may he contest the commission's refusal in the courts. The commission may, however, delay in filing suit to enforce the subpoena, or may publicly investigate without subpoenaing the registrant, s8 and in such cases no
remedy is available to him.
Neither employers nor employees may appeal from National Labor Relations
Board directions of election, since determinations made in employee representation proceedings were not included within the review provisions of the act.59 But
even if representation proceedings had been considered adversary proceedings
and had been included within the review provisions, no appeal could be taken
from directions of election under the final order rule, since they are but intermediate stages in representation proceedings. An employer's desire to contest a
direction of election might be based on the theory that such proceedings would
tend to disrupt a harmonious employer-employee relationship and prevent em53Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.(2d) 212 (App. D.C. i939); Sanders Bros. Radio Station
v. FCC, io6 F.(2d) 321 (App. D.C. 1939).
s4 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. i (x936).
"sResources Corporation Int'l v. SEC, 97 F.(2d) 788 (C.C.A. 7th 1938).
6Jones v. SEC, 79 F. (2d) 617 (1936), cert. den. 297 U.S. 705 (1936).
S7Except perhaps by resort to equity, which, as will later appear, is an inadequate and un-

satisfactory remedy.
5"The situation here is comparable to that in which the ICC makes a final valuation which
may not be put in issue for several years. See argument of appellee in United States v. Los
Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 314 (1927). For a discussion of this point see Appealability of Administrative Orders, 47 Yale L.J. 766, 77, (938).
s9 AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
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ployees from giving full attention to their work. 60 An employer may not appeal
directly even from a certification order, but by refusing to bargain with the
certified union, he can provoke the issuance of an order to cease and desist from
the unfair labor practice, which order would be appealable. On appeal from
such an order the certification can be put in issue.6' Although certifications
may conceivably cause real injury to employee groups, even this circuitous
method of reviewing certifications is beyond their reach. Since certification permanently entrenches in power a particular union group, the certification order
seems of sufficient importance to employee groups to justify granting them the
right to appeal from a challenged determination.62
EQUITABLE RE'EDIES

Otherwise non-appealable interlocutory orders may sometimes be attacked
by resort to the general equity powers of the federal courts. Thus, in Mallory
Coal Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal Com'n6 the plaintiff sought to appeal from an
order under which the commission was to publicize confidential information
which the plaintiff had filed. The order was contested as beyond the commission's statutory authority. An appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia was denied on the ground that the commission's order was interlocutory and could be reviewed only on appeal from a final order. Subsequently,
another producer in the same situation was denied an injunction against enforcement of the order in the District Court of the District of Columbia. On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the lower court's decision that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin the commission.4 The Supreme Court,5 however, reversed the
court of appeals, thus allowing the petitioners to accomplish by an extra-statutory method-injunction-that which the court in the Mallory case held they
could not do directly, by means of appeal. 6
That there should be any possibility of review of administrative orders in a
district court in the face of statutory provisions that all appeals must be taken
6

o Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 86 F.(2d) 862 (App. D.C. 1936); Cupples Co. v. NLRB, o3
F.(2d) 953 (C.C.A. 8th 1939); Ames Baldwin Wyoming Co. v. NLRB, 73 F.(ad) 489 (C.C.A.
4th 1934)6

1In the Matter of the NLRB, 304 U.S. 486, 493 (1938).
Chi. L. Rev. 144, 146 n. i4 (1939).
6 99 F.(2d) 399 (App. D.C. 1938).
64 Utah Fuel Co. v. Natl Bituminous Coal Com'n, ioz F.(2d) 426 (App. D.C. 1938).
6s 306 U.S. 56 (1939).
62 7 Univ.

6AFL v. NLRB, io3 F.(2d) 933 (App. D.C. 1939), suggests that equitable relief might be
available to a union seeking to appeal from a certification order. Although the question of availability of such relief was argued before the Supreme Court, the issue was not decided, the Court
remarking that the question was not properly before it on the record. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S.
401, 412 (1940). This question is raised in suits recently filed in the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois by the manufacturing companies and some of their employees
to enjoin the NLRB from holding run-off elections. Chicago Tribune, col r, p. 31 (Oct. 1o,
194o). To present the issue squarely, however, the suit should have been brought by the union
organization which was left off the ballot.
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to the circuit court of appeals 67 seems anomalous. Review of administrative
orders by a single judge exercising equity jurisdiction is in the teeth of the legislative direction that such cases should be handled only by courts of three or
more members.6" The development of equity review of interlocutory orders
under these circumstances indicates clearly that a blanket denial of the right to
appeal from all interlocutory determinations under the final order rule is not a
satisfactory method of dealing with the complainant's rights. At the same time,
the fact that review of certain interlocutory orders may be obtained by resort
to equity is proof that the final order rule has not served to protect completely
administrative agencies against interruptions of their proceedings at intermediate stages. Is review of interlocutory orders in equity a satisfactory solution,
however, in the light of the needs of both complainant and the administrative
agencies?
While it is generally said that equity will grant review where irreparable injury is threatened, 69what the courts consider irreparable injury is hardly capable of specific statement. Thus, while the Supreme Court in Utah Fuel Co. v.
Nat'l Bituminous Coal Com'n7o held that unauthorized publication of confidential reports threatened irreparable damage and authorized the court to consider
granting equitable relief, in a previous case it held that a showing by an employer of the substantial damage inevitably following from an unauthorized National Labor Relations Board hearing did not threaten irreparable injury.7' In
suits to enjoin subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Federal Trade Commission, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a statutory
penalty of imprisonment for disobedience constituted a threat of irreparable
67National Bituminous Coal Act § 6(b), (d), 50 Stat. 85 (1937), i5 U.S.C.A. § 836(b), (d)
(i939); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32, 48 Stat. 904, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 et seq. (Supp.
1939); FederalPowerAct § 213,49 Stat. 86o (1935), i6 U.S.C.A. § 825(I)(b) (Supp. 1939); Na-

tional Labor Relations Act § Io(f), 49 Stat. 455 (i935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o(f) (Supp. i939). In
Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal Com'n, ioi F.(2d) 426, 428-29 (App. D.C. 1938), the
court said: "It is also a well established rule that orders of federal administrative agencies may
be reviewed only in the courts and pursuant to the procedures specified by Congress in the pertinent statutes," citing Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D.C. 1935), cert. den.
296 U.S. 624 (i935); Monocacy Broadcasting Co. v. Prall, 90 F. (2d) 421 (App. D.C. 1937);
SEC v. Andrews, 88 F.(2d) 44r (C.C.A. 2d 1937); Federal Power Com'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1938). See Newport Electric Co. v. Federal Power Com'n, 97 F.(2d) 580
(C.C.A. 2d 1938); McAllister, op. cit. supra note x5, at z66. Note 7 supra.
Question may be raised as to whether Congress could expressly forbid review of interlocutory orders in equity while retaining the final order rule. No recent case has indicated whether
such restrictions on reviewability will be permitted. Of course, if review in equity were absolutely prohibited there would be no problem of a bifurcated system of review. But the question
of the desirability of permitting interlocutory appeals would still remain.
68 Note 7 supra.

69Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Cases, 46 Yale LJ. 255 (1936).
7o 306

U.S. 56 (i939). The Court denied relief on the merits.

71 Myers

v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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injury,72 whereas the Supreme Court has previously held that a statutory pen-

alty of forfeiture of $ioo a day for disobedience did not.73 And the requirement
of threatened irreparable injury has been held to be satisfied by an order requiring the production of evidence in a place far removed from the location of the
7
business of the party subpoenaed. 4
Even when the requirement of irreparable injury is satisfied, equity will not
grant relief unless the order complained of is challenged as unconstitutional or
"void." Thus, subpoenas which violate the unreasonable searches and seizures
provision of the Constitution are enjoinable,75 as are orders issued without prior
notice and hearing in violation of a statutory requirement therefor.71 But orders
which are "merely erroneous," i.e., abuses of discretionary powers which are
conceded to exist, are not reviewable in equity. Examples of such orders are a
Securities and Exchange Commission determination that permission to withdraw a registration statement after it had become effective was not in the public
interest,77 and the Federal Communication Commission's determination that a
competitor did not have sufficient interest in the proceeding to be allowed to intervene.78 The line of demarcation between mere abuses of administrative discretion in the interpretation of statutory provisions and abuses so flagrant as to
approach the "void" category does not seem to be drawn clearly enough to serve
as a practical guide for determining reviewability.
Thus, the elasticity of the concepts which form the basis of equity review
makes such review at best an uncertain avenue of escape for a litigant suffering
from the hardships of the final order rule. At the same time, an equity court
neither does nor can assess the requirements of the public interest as represented
by the efficient functioning of administrative tribunals. Furthermore, review
in equity complicates and disturbs orderly procedures and militates against the
creation of a unified system of appeals.
FTC v. Millers' Nat'l Federation, 23 F.(2d) 968 (App. D.C. 1927).
73 FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274 U.S. i6o (1927).
74 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas, 1o5 F.(2d) ioo (App. D.C.
72

1939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 15o (1939).
7S Handler,

The Constitutionality of Investigations by the Federal Trade Commission II,

28 Col. L. Rev. 9o5 (1928).
76 Saltzman v. Stromberg-Carlson Tel. Mfg. Co., 46 F.(2d) 612 (App. D.C. 1931); CourierJournal Co. v. Federal Radio Com'n, 46 F. (2d) 614 (App. D.C. 1931); cf. Monocacy Broadcasting Co. v. Prall, 90 F.(2d) 421 (App. D.C. 1937). See Black River Valley Broadcasts v.
McNinch, ioi F.(2d) 235 (App. D.C. 1938), cert. den. 307 U.S. 623 (1939).
77 This order was contested in Resources Corporation Int'l v. SEC, 97 F.(2d) 788 (C.C.A.
7th 1938). The court refused to pass on the merits on the ground that the order was interlocutory and as such not reviewable. But in Resources Corporation Int'l v. SEC, 1o3 F. (2d) 929
(App. D.C. 1939), the court held that where stock had already been issued the commission
could deny withdrawal of the issue. The Jones case was distinguished on the ground that there
no stock had been sold.
78Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F.(2d) 729 (App. D.C. 1935), cert. den. 296 U.S. 624 (1935).
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CONCLUSION

The basic criticism of the final order rule is found in its indiscriminate denial
of appealability to all interlocutory orders without regard for the variations
between them both in type and in their effect upon litigants. A refusal of confidential treatment by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the National
Bituminous Coal Commission may more severely injure a complainant than an
order for a hearing by the Federal Trade Commission. Speed in administrative
procedures may be sacrificed with fewer undesirable consequences when a radio
station license is at stake than when an employee election under the National
Labor Relations Act is pending. These problems involve achieving a balance
between efficient regulation in the public interest on the one hand, and protection of private property rights on the other, and such questions are traditionally
and properly for Congress to decide.
Legislative draftsmen should carefully specify in the review provisions of
each statute setting up an administrative agency the orders, both interlocutory
and final, from which an appeal may be taken and the scope of review to be accorded each order.9 That such specification is possible is evident from the statutory provision for interlocutory appeals from federal district courts, as well as
from the numerous state statutes with similar provisions.80 The review provisions embodied in the Federal Communications Commission Act seem a step in
this direction. 8'
In determining which interlocutory orders are to be made appealable, Congress should in each case consider the following factors:
x) Importance of the individual rights asserted;
2) Magnitude of the injury threatened by the particular administrative action;
3) Urgency of the administrative adjudication;
4) Possibilities of nuisance appeals;
5) Reparability of the injury after the final order has been issued;
6) Increased burden which the hearing of interlocutory appeals will impose upon reviewing courts; and
7) The number of litigants affected by the particular type of order.
79Specification of the non-orders would also aid in clarification. Note 8 supra.
So Note 21

supra.
Stat. I97 (1937), 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b) (Supp. 1939). "An appeal may be taken, in the
manner hereinafter provided, from decisions of the Commission to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in any of the following cases:
(i) By an applicant for a construction permit for a radio station, or for a radio station license,
or for modification of an existing radio station license, whose application is refused by the
Commission.
(2) By any person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the
Commission granting or refusing any such application.
(3) By any radio operator whose license has been suspended by the Commission."
Although no provision is here made for interlocutory appeals, this classification of appealable
orders indicates the feasibility of detailed statutory classifications of the various possible types
of administrative orders for purposes of determining reviewability.
'r So
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The Congress could gather evidence as to each of these factors both from the
administrative agencies themselves and from attorneys whose practice before
these agencies have acquainted them with the problems here involved. The
amending process should be used as frequently as experience warrants it.
As has been shown, the indiscriminate operation of the final order rule, which
results in a denial of appealability to orders which courts feel impelled by elementary considerations of justice to review, has fostered a tendency to extend
the extraordinary remedies to provide relief from certain interlocutory orders.
Careful draftsmanship of appeal provisions to provide relief from interlocutory
orders causing the greatest hardship would stop this tendency. Today, equity
courts may rightly feel that Congress has given no consideration to the plight of
one who claims injury under an interlocutory order and therefore they may feel
justified in extending their protection to such persons. Should Congress, however, after consideration of the above-mentioned factors, determine that in the
public interest no appeal should be permitted in a particular type of case, it is
reasonable to expect the courts to abide by such a decision. Some orders now
reviewable in equity will be made appealable under the criteria previously suggested, others may be made specifically non-appealable. The disadvantages
from the administrative standpoint would be in some degree compensated by
the increased certainty that orders made non-reviewable by statute would actually not be reviewed, and those reviewable would be reviewed only by the
statutory method.
A limited number of interlocutory appeals need not unduly hamper administrative agencies, nor unduly burden the courts. Statutory penalties for frivolous appeals, to be imposed by the courts of review, might well serve as a deterrent to those impelled primarily by a desire to hamstring the administrative
agency. In this respect, determination of whether a petitioner has reasonable
ground for appeal seems much more clearly a judicial task than, for example,
determination of whether a particular type of damage constitutes irreparable
injury, particularly in a field where, for the non-expert, facts are difficult to
evaluate. Finally, specification of the stages at which review is allowed would
tend to relieve both courts and administrative agencies from the burden of cases
requiring interpretation of the final order rule.

